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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak 
A Powerful Player  
between Generals and Brotherhood 
During the last decade of the Mubarak era a handful 
of leading Egyptian entrepreneurs gained control over 
large sections of their country’s economy. That also 
made them part of the politically relevant elite, whose 
members wield influence over fundamental strategic 
decisions. This begs the question of the role of the 
business elite in the Egyptian transformation process 
that began with the toppling of Hosni Mubarak in 
early 2011. Will it succeed in defending its leading 
position in Egypt’s economy? And above all: Will it 
continue to play an important political role in the 
post-Mubarak era? 
As the following analysis shows, Egyptian top-
entrepreneurs to date has been extremely successful 
in preserving both economic power and political 
influence. Although the anger of many Egyptians who 
took to the streets to protest against the regime in ear-
ly 2011 was also directed against a business elite they 
regarded as corrupt, most entrepreneurs managed 
to hang on to their business empires through the tur-
moil. Very few leading businessmen were taken to 
court in the months following the political transfor-
mation. Most profited from the lenient stance on 
fraud and corruption taken by the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces, which initially took charge, and 
the associated lack of transparency and legal rigour. 
The Muslim Brotherhood continued the same 
course. Even before its candidate Mohammed Morsi 
won the 2012 presidential elections, it was working 
towards an alliance with the established business elite 
and did nothing to support demands from civil society 
for thorough investigation of wrongdoing by business 
figures. Instead, the Brotherhood prioritised out-of-
court settlements and sought to integrate the estab-
lished business elite into its own power networks. But 
above all it built its economic policies on principles 
inherited from the Mubarak era, such as a focus on 
growth and the private sector. This course, which the 
international donor community never tired of prais-
ing, especially benefited the country’s wealthiest 
business owners. 
But the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt to co-opt 
Egypt’s business elite failed, along with the efforts of 
certain Brotherhood members to significantly expand 
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6 
their own business activities. Only a handful of lead-
ing entrepreneurs came to terms with the Brother-
hood and accepted its claim to political power. Most 
supported its adversaries by funding opposition 
parties and politicians and via private-sector media. 
Much of the mostly secular-minded business elite was 
fundamentally mistrustful of the proponents of polit-
ical Islam, who do not belong to their social circles. 
Their wariness deepened during the course of Morsi’s 
presidency, as his government exhibited a grave lack 
of professionalism in its economic policy and sent in-
creasingly contradictory signals to the business camp. 
Its conflict with sections of the business elite con-
tributed to the Brotherhood’s failure to consolidate 
the power acquired through elections. Morsi’s removal 
by the armed forces at the beginning of July 2013 
came about under pressure from the streets. However, 
behind the scenes entrenched interest groups includ-
ing the business elite had been working for months to 
ensure the Brotherhood’s political downfall. The Morsi 
government, whose political manoeuvring found ever-
diminishing support in the population, lacked the 
strength to push back against the resistance of these 
groups, including the business elite. 
The influence of big business on the political pro-
cess is likely to remain considerable. The transitional 
government is composed largely of politicians and 
technocrats who are close to business interests. This 
in itself suggests that the interests of the business 
elite are likely to be protected as the transformation 
process progresses. Regardless of the current political 
turmoil, Germany and the European Union should 
therefore shape their long-term cooperation in such a 
way as to counteract the foreseeable negative con-
sequences of such influence. Firstly, they should do 
more to promote reform of the regulatory framework 
of the Egyptian economy, particularly enhancing 
transparency in relation to state activity in the econ-
omy and reforming the competition laws. Profession-
alisation of the Egyptian media sector should also be 
advanced, to permit it to exercise an independent con-
trol function. 
Secondly, Germany and Europe should help Egypt 
to establish a more equitable tax system and a more 
efficient revenue service. Egypt cannot achieve 
social peace if the one-sided growth policy of the late 
Mubarak era is simply continued. For without more 
active state-led redistribution policies, economic devel-
opment is unlikely to achieve a broader impact. 
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The Business Elite and the End of the Mubarak Regime 
 
The protests that led to the fall of Mubarak in 2011 
were directed not only against political repression and 
despotism, but also against social injustice and ram-
pant corruption. The lead-up was marked by growing 
popular anger against the Egyptian business elite, 
which had profited greatly from the privatisation 
policies of the previous decades. Its members, popu-
larly known as “fat cats”, were accused of having 
acquired their wealth principally through networks 
with the political leadership. The large number of 
businessmen who occupied important political func-
tions during Mubarak’s last decade was regarded as 
evidence of this. Putting an end to this system of 
“crony capitalism” and reining in the powerful busi-
ness families became a central demand of the protest 
movement.1
Background: Oligarchisation of the 
Economy under Mubarak 
 Cracks also appeared within the regime 
itself. Especially among the generals, there was dis-
approval of the growing political influence of certain 
business leaders. However, the business elite’s loss of 
influence during the months following Mubarak’s 
removal was only marginal. 
During the Mubarak era many Egyptians felt excluded 
from the country’s economic development and saw 
the divide between rich and poor expanding. Indeed, 
the high economic growth rates since the millennium 
often stood in contradiction to the country’s social 
development. Between 2005 and 2008 GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of more than 6 percent while the 
general standard of living failed to improve. On the 
contrary – according to official figures poverty con-
tinued to increase, especially among the rural popu-
lation.2
 
1  On the concept of “crony capitalism” see, amongst others, 
Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the 
Politics of Development in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 156ff. 
 
2  By 2008 22 percent of the population were living below 
the national poverty line, up from 20 percent in 2005. World 
Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, http://data.worldbank. 
At the same time, the widely held belief that a 
small business elite had gained significant control 
over the country’s economy was certainly not far 
from reality. During Hosni Mubarak’s three decades 
in power the private sector transformed fundamen-
tally in two respects. 
Firstly, private companies came to play an in-
creasingly important role in the Egyptian economy. 
Through his policy of economic opening (infitah), 
Mubarak’s predecessor Anwar al-Sadat had already 
begun improving the general conditions for private 
entrepreneurship in the late 1970s. At first, Mubarak 
only cautiously continued this policy, launching a 
policy of economic structural adjustment in the early 
1990s. However, from 2004 on, the privatisation pro-
cess was intensified. Between 2004 and 2008 alone 
the Egyptian state more than doubled its privatisation 
revenues compared to the preceding decade.3
8
 The 
growing importance of the private sector relative to 
the still weighty public sector was reflected above all 
in the development of employment and domestic in-
vestment. While the private sector’s share of employ-
ment rose by more than 10 percentage points to 73 
percent, its share of investment almost doubled to 
62 percent (see figure, page ).4
Secondly, a noteworthy concentration of capital 
took place within the private sector. While at the 
beginning of the 1980s there were no major private 
businesses to speak of, by the end of the Mubarak 
era numerous sectors were dominated by individual 
privately-owned companies. This concentration of 
capital was a direct consequence of Mubarak’s priva-
tisation policies. In an environment of widespread 
corruption affecting the sale of state-owned com-
panies and the awarding of public contracts, a small 
 
 
org/sites/default/files/wdi-2012-ebook.pdf (accessed 4 June 
2013). 
3  Stephan Roll, Geld und Macht: Finanzsektorreformen und 
politische Bedeutungszunahme der Unternehmer- und Finanzelite in 
Ägypten (Berlin, 2010), 120. 
4  While the private sector’s share of GDP remained constant, 
the relevance of that figure is limited because a great deal of 
the state’s share originates from the Suez Canal and resource 
production, which are strongly influenced by international 
transport trends and world market prices for oil and gas. 
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The importance of the private sector in the Egyptian economy 1985–2011 
Own depiction, source: Egyptian Planning Ministry. 
 
number of entrepreneurs succeeded in establishing 
huge business empires. Although the private sector 
continued to be characterised by small and medium-
sized companies (in 2006 just 0.1 percent of Egyptian 
companies employed more than 100 workers),5
Together the twin trends of a growing private sec-
tor and a concentration of capital enabled a small 
group of individuals and families to gain control over 
a large slice of the economy through ownership 
and management relationships. While there has been 
little empirical investigation of the precise composi-
tion of this group, it was estimated at the end of 2010 
that at least twenty-one families owned net assets 
of more than $100 million each (see Table 1, p. 
 the 
few major private enterprises generally held monop-
oly positions in their sectors: Ezz Industries in steel, 
Ghabbour Auto for cars and Juhayna Food Industries 
in the dairy industry. 
27). 
Some of these families, first and foremost Sawiris and 
Mansour, were worth billions.6
 
5  African Development Bank, Egypt Private Sector Country 
Profile 2009, 115, http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/ 
Documents/Project-and-Operations/Brochure%20Egypt%20 
Anglais.pdf (accessed 2 June 2013). 
 The predominance 
of this core business elite was reflected very clearly 
on the Egyptian stock exchange. In 2008 eleven busi-
ness families controlled more than 30 percent of the 
market capitalisation of the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) 
6  In 2012 Forbes magazine put the fortune of the Sawiris 
family at about $11 billion, that of the three Mansour 
brothers exceeding $6 billion. Forbes, The World’s Billionaires 
2012, http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/#page:1_sort:0_ 
direction:asc_search:_filter:All%20industries_filter:Egypt_ 
filter:All%20 states (accessed 4 June 2013). 
via their holdings.7 Closely connected to these oli-
garchs were numerous subcontractors and managers 
of major companies, who themselves possessed 
considerable wealth. Consultants Wealth-X estimate 
that in 2011 there were 490 families with net assets 
amounting to at least $30 million living in Egypt. 
Together their wealth exceeded $65 billion.8 Measured 
in terms of personal wealth on the eve of the political 
transformation in early 2011, the Egyptian business 
elite thus comprised several hundred families and 
individuals.9
Cracks in the Edifice: The Business Elite, 
Gamal Mubarak and the Military 
 
By virtue of their dominant position in the Egyptian 
economy, members of the business elite had also risen 
 
7  Stephan Roll, “‘Finance Matters!’ The Influence of Financial 
Sector Reforms on the Development of the Entrepreneurial 
Elite in Egypt”, Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 3 (2010): 360. 
8  Wealth-X, World Ultra Wealth Report 2012–2013 (Singapore, 
2012), 91, http://wealthx.com/wealthreport/Wealth-X-world-
ultra-wealth-report.pdf (accessed 4 June 2013). 
9  In social science there is no single definition of the 
term “elite”. In recent research the term is generally used 
to identify groups who have “access to important power 
resources that permit them to exert influence on significant 
decisions within a society”. Translated from Ursula Hoff-
mann-Lange, Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik 
(Opladen, 1992), 83. For entrepreneurs capital represents 
such a power resource. While the figure of $30 million for 
individual wealth is arbitrary, it does offer a useful starting 
point for defining membership of this group in Egypt. 
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9 
to join the circles of the “politically relevant elite”.10 
Leading business figures who acquired important 
ministerial posts included Rachid Mohamed Rachid, 
local partner of the international food company Uni-
lever, and Mohamed Mansour, whose family business 
is the world’s largest General Motors distributor. 
Others, first and foremost steel magnate Ahmed Ezz, 
occupied central positions in parliament and in the 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Ezz, whose 
conglomerate possessed a virtual monopoly in the 
national steel sector, chaired the budget committee 
in the lower house of parliament and served on all 
the ruling party’s leading bodies.11
That said, many business leaders avoided direct 
political involvement. Nevertheless, they too possessed 
multiple channels of influence to safeguard their in-
terests in the political process. Such indirect influence 
was most obvious in the case of the Coptic Sawiris, 
probably the country’s richest family with interests 
in construction, tourism and telecommunications. 
Through business relationships with leading politi-
cians, stakes in the Egyptian media sector and mem-
bership of business organisations and associations 
they were able to inject their interests into the politi-
cal process. A particularly important role was played 
by the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), 
founded in the mid-1990s by a group of influential 
business figures and granted more than $10 million 
in 2001 by the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID).
 
12 The institute’s studies apply the 
principles of neoliberalism to Egypt’s specific situ-
ation, concentrating on promoting the private sector 
and continuing Egypt’s opening to foreign trade.13
 
10  The politically relevant elite comprises “those people in 
a given country who wield political influence and power in 
that they make strategic decisions or participate in decision-
making on a national level, contribute to defining political 
norms and values including (including the definition of 
‘national interests’), and directly influence political dis-
course on strategic issues.” Volker Perthes, “Politics and 
Elite Change in the Arab World”, in Arab Elites: Negotiating 
the Politics of Change, ed. idem (Boulder, CO, 2004), 5. 
 
11  Thomas Demmelhuber and Stephan Roll, Herrschaftssiche-
rung in Ägypten: Zur Rolle von Reformen und Wirtschaftsoligarchen, 
SWP-Studie 20/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, July 2007), 24. 
12  David B. Ottaway, Egypt at the Tipping Point? Middle 
East Program Occasional Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
summer 2010), 5. 
13  On ECES’s role in economic policy-making during the 
later years of the Mubarak era, see Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt 
after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World 
However, ECES papers also contain calls for certain 
interventionist measures. 
Another reason why ECES acquired such great 
political influence was that the president’s son, Gamal 
Mubarak, was one of its founding members. From 
the late 1990s on, as he was groomed to succeed his 
father, his relationship with the business elite formed 
a partnership of convenience. Because Gamal Mubarak 
– unlike Hosni Mubarak and his predecessor Sadat – 
was a civilian he had no reliable power base within 
the armed forces and was forced to depend on the 
support of other actors. He chose the wealthy entre-
preneurs, who were in turn able to advance their 
interests politically with his help. Thus it was Gamal 
Mubarak who pushed the ruling party’s political 
realignment under the slogan of “new thinking” and 
supported the revision of the NDP’s programme to 
remove residual socialist aspects. The line pushed by 
the ECES was the decisive impulse in this process: 
a liberal economic system with a strong state. Gamal 
Mubarak also recruited numerous well-known busi-
nessmen to the NDP’s committees that he chaired. His 
alliance with the business elite became particularly 
clear in the cabinet reshuffle of 2005, where six of the 
ministers in the new government of Prime Minister 
Ahmed Nazif (2004–2011) were well-known business 
figures with obvious connections to him.14
The closeness of important entrepreneurs to Ga-
mal Mubarak also provoked resistance among other 
parts of the politically relevant elite. Members of 
the bureaucracy and above all the armed forces grew 
concerned that they could become increasingly 
marginalised in the Egyptian power system. Many 
officers watched with bitterness as the wealth of a 
small group of businessmen expanded while their 
own privileges and the military’s sprawling business 
activities drew growing public criticism. Since the late 
1970s the armed forces had incrementally expanded 
its involvement in the civilian economy, although the 
exact extent of this activity remains unknown. It is 
estimated that businesses controlled by the armed 
 They put 
the ruling party’s liberal economic course into prac-
tice, with a selective approach ensuring that members 
of the business elite were the main beneficiaries of 
the new policy. 
 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 211ff. On the 
Sawiris family’s investments in the media sector see pp. 21ff. 
14  Demmelhuber and Roll, Herrschaftssicherung in Ägypten 
(see note 11), 22. 
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10 
forces contribute 5 to 15 percent of Egypt’s GDP.15 Of 
course military businesses also compete with private-
ly-owned companies,16 but the private sector is heavily 
dependent on the military when it comes to buying 
land, for example to build new factories or tourist 
resorts. The armed forces possess the legal power to 
confiscate public land at any time for purposes of 
national security.17 This right of veto over the pri-
vatisation of building land has been sharply criticised 
by members of the business elite.18
But there was no break between the two groups. 
Over the decades close networks had grown between 
the generals and various leading entrepreneurs, with 
the latter functioning for example as advisers and 
service providers in connection with arms deals. One 
good example is Shafiq Gabr, a businessman with 
impeccable international contacts and his own busi-
ness representation in Washington. His Artoc Group 
represented numerous international firms in Egypt 
and supplied the armed forces with a wide range of 
civilian and dual-use goods.
 
19 Army-owned firms also 
maintained partnerships with major foreign com-
panies in which members of the Egyptian business 
elite were also involved. After 2001 for example, the 
Kharafi Group, which is owned by the most impor-
tant Kuwaiti business family and operates in Egypt 
through a plethora of subsidiaries, increasingly 
entered into joint ventures with the armed forces.20
 
15  Chérine Chams El-Dine, The Military and Egypt’s Transfor-
mation Process: Preservation of the Military’s Reserve Domains, SWP 
Comments 6/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
February 2013), 2. 
 
These activities were engineered by the Kharafi 
family’s Egyptian “representative”, Moataz al-Alfi, 
16  For example in the market for bottled drinking water, 
where the military’s Safi label competes with multinational 
corporations like Nestlé and PepsiCo as well as local private-
sector suppliers, led by the Mansour group’s Hayat brand. 
17  Zeinab Abul-Magd, “The Army and the Economy in Egypt”, 
Jadalyyia, 23 December 2011. 
18  “US Embassy Cables: Egyptian Military’s Influence in 
Decline, US Told”, Guardian.co.uk, 3 February 2011, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/ 
171176 (accessed 4 June 2013). 
19  Artoc Group supplied the military with all kinds of equip-
ment, from ejector seats (ARTOC Suez) to equipment for the 
army’s fitness studios (ARTOC Sports). Artoc Group for Invest-
ment and Development, http://www.artoc.com/. 
20  Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals and 
Transitional Capital”, MERIP Middle East Report 42, no. 262 (2012). 
one of the most politically influential business 
leaders of the Mubarak era.21
“Fat Cats” behind Bars? 
 
The Egyptian authorities began taking action against 
members of the business elite at the end of January 
2011, answering the call of the mass demonstrations 
against the Mubarak regime which had begun only 
a few days earlier. In response to the protesters’ 
demands, the office of the public prosecutor launched 
investigations into corruption and abuse of office and 
imposed travel bans on numerous business figures.22
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
immediately took charge and ruled Egypt until Presi-
dent Mohammed Morsi took office on 30 June 2012. 
Initially SCAF stepped up the criminal investigations 
into members of the business elite. Three prominent 
businessmen were detained or sought on internation-
al arrest warrants: former housing minister Ahmed 
al-Maghrabi, former tourism minister Zuhair Garana 
and steel entrepreneur Ahmed Ezz. Additionally a 
“blacklist” was published of suspects who were pro-
hibited from freely disposing of their wealth.
 
The power centre around Hosni Mubarak was plainly 
attempting to present the protesters with a scapegoat 
for the country’s precarious socio-economic plight in 
order to move itself out of the line of fire. Mubarak’s 
forced resignation on 11 February 2011 revealed the 
failure of this strategy. 
23
 
21  Moataz al-Alfi was a member of Gamal Mubarak’s business 
network. He served as vice-president of Gamal’s Future Gen-
eration Foundation and was a member of the Egyptian Centre 
for Economic Studies. Al-Alfi’s brother served on several high-
ranking committees of the ruling NDP, which is reported to 
have received generous donations from the Kharafi Group. 
Marion Dixon, “The Corporate Standard and the Reproduc-
tion of the Dominant Class in Egypt” (paper presented at the 
International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, Ithaca, 
NY, 17–19 October 2002, 10). 
 In view 
of the competition between military and various pri-
vate-sector interests outlined above, SCAF was plainly 
seizing the moment to settle old scores. Nevertheless, 
no systematic action was taken against the Egyptian 
22  Although many prominent members of the business elite 
managed to leave the country at the last minute. “Families 
of Egypt’s Business Elite Leave”, Saudi Gazette, 31 January 2011. 
23  The list was successively expanded over the following 
months; by 30 November 2011 it included the names of 262 
suspects and family members. The list (in Arabic) can be 
viewed at http://gate.ahram.org.eg/Media/News/2011/12/4/ 
2011-634586222807697433-769.pdf (accessed 4 June 2013). 
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business elite. Those who maintained good relations 
with the military had little to fear,24 and even those 
who did not enjoy its protection were still able to 
leave the country. Numerous private jets transported 
wealthy families and their assets out of the country.25 
The Bank for International Settlements estimates that 
foreign banks’ liabilities to Egyptian citizens increased 
by more than $6 billion during the first quarter of 
2011 alone.26
In the ensuing months the military leadership con-
tinued to avoid taking systematic action against cor-
ruption. Although various state agencies did initiate 
investigations, these were often stalled or dropped 
for lack of evidence. By September 2012 – more than 
eighteen months after the start of the political trans-
formation – the Illicit Gains Authority based in the 
Justice Ministry had referred only 29 of 597 reported 
cases to the courts.
 
27
At the beginning of 2012 the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces amended the investment law, 
making it possible to escape a conviction for criminal 
activities such as embezzlement of public funds, cor-
ruption or tax evasion through out-of-court settle-
 Ultimately only four members of 
the twenty-one families of the core business elite were 
given prison sentences (Rachid Mohamed Rachid, 
Ahmed al Maghrabi, Ahmed Ezz and Hussein Salem) 
and some of the verdicts were still under appeal in 
July 2013. 
 
24  In some cases the military even protected the facilities 
of business partners, as in the case of the Kharafi Group. 
Marshall and Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals and Transitional 
Capital” (see note 20). 
25  The best-known example is Hussein Salem, who con-
trolled the gas trade between Egypt and Israel and is accused 
of massive corruption. According to unconfirmed press 
reports $500 million were found in his luggage when he en-
tered Dubai at the end of January 2011. Salem, who also 
possesses Spanish citizenship, was arrested in June 2011 in 
Spain, after Egypt issued an international arrest warrant, but 
has yet to be extradited to Egypt. “Spain Refuses Extradition 
of Mubarak’s Right-hand Man”, Daily News Egypt, 24 December 
2012. 
26  Bank for International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, 
September 2011, 18, http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_ 
qt1109.pdf (accessed 4 June 2013). Illegal capital flight 
has long been a problem for the Egyptian economy. Global 
Financial Integrity estimates that on average $3 billion were 
transferred abroad illegally from Egypt every year between 
2001 and 2010. 
27  “‘One Year On, Egyptian Corruption Cases Still in Limbo’: 
IGA Head”, Ahram Online, 24 September 2012, http://english. 
ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/53669/Business/Economy/ 
Majority-of-Egypts-corruption-cases-filed-since--s.aspx (accessed 
3 July 2013). 
ments. Contracts that have come into being illicitly, 
for example through corruption, can thus be legalised 
post facto by means of financial compensation, while 
embezzled funds may simply be repaid. The first 
major business figure to make use of this opportunity 
was Yassin Mansour of the Mansour Group who was 
able to have several cases dropped by paying the equiv-
alent of more than $40 million.28
Because of the difficulties involved in establishing 
conclusive proof for prosecutions, experts regularly 
called for out-of-court solutions. But the processes 
established by the generals fell short of any accepted 
legal standards. Firstly, their execution was placed in 
the hands not of an independent commission, but of 
the General Authority for Investment (GAFI), whose 
remit is to promote investment in Egypt. The GAFI had 
no interest in any kind of confrontation that would 
worsen the investment climate, especially concerning 
foreign investors. The intransparency of the proce-
dure, where ultimately the director of GAFI merely 
had to sign an agreement with the respective business-
person, was an open invitation for manipulation. 
Secondly, the amnesty arrangement was not restricted 
to past transgressions and can also be applied to 
future misdeeds. Entrepreneurs have little incentive 
to obey the law in their investment activities if they 
can rely on violations being settled retroactively out 
of court.
 
29
Mubarak’s fall thus initially affected above all the 
direct political influence of the established business 
elite. In the governments appointed by SCAF between 
February 2011 and August 2012 Mounir Fakhry Abdel 
Nour was the only familiar face from this milieu. The 
economic consequences were, however, limited. Of 
course leading entrepreneurs were not immune from 
the immediate economic repercussions of the political 
transition, mainly in the form of strikes and produc-
tion stoppages.
 
30
 
28  “PHD’s Mansour Cleared in State-land Sale Cases”, 
Mubasher.info, 2 July 2012. 
 But in contrast to small and medium-
29  Shereen Zaki, “How SCAF Is Seeking to Resolve Corruption 
Cases behind Closed Doors”, The Arabist, 28 February 2012; 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, Memorandum Concern-
ing the Decree of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Permitting 
Reconciliation in Crimes against Public Property (Arabic), February 
2012, http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/pressreleases/pdf/eipr_ 
memo_law4_2012.pdf (accessed 3 June 2013). 
30  Even before 2011 there were frequent strikes and sponta-
neous stoppages. But in the course of the political transfor-
mation such activities multiplied. It is estimated that more 
than 1,100 labour protests took place between May 2011 and 
April 2012. Nadine Abdalla, Egypt’s Workers – From Protest Move-
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sized companies, major private-sector companies were 
able to at least partly offset domestic losses through 
their foreign operations. They also possessed enough 
financial leeway to see them through hard times.31
 
 
The established business elite’s leading role in Egypt’s 
economy thus survived the storm. 
 
 
ment to Organized Labor: A Major Challenge of the Transition Period, 
SWP Comments 32/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, October 2012), 2. 
31  One good example is Ghabbour Auto, which dominates 
the Egyptian car market and is majority owned by the 
Ghabbour family. Despite the political turbulence Ghabbour 
Auto was able to steadily expand sales and recorded the best 
result in its history in the first quarter of 2013, principally 
because of outstanding foreign sales (above all in Iraq). 
“Egypt’s GB Auto Enjoys Record Sales Revenues”, Ahram Online, 
16 May 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 
3/12/71643/Business/Economy/Egypts-GB-Auto-enjoys-record-
sales-revenues.aspx (accessed 3 July 2013). 
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The Muslim Brotherhood and the Established Business Elite 
 
The collapse of the old regime gave the Muslim 
Brotherhood the opportunity to govern Egypt. As 
the largest and best-organised opposition force from 
the Mubarak era, the Brotherhood was in a position 
to expect an easy election victory, and therefore sup-
ported the gradual transformation process proposed 
by the generals: the drafting of a new constitution to 
follow rather than precede parliamentary elections. 
And indeed, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (FJP) won a clear victory in the parliamentary 
elections held in December 2011 and January 2012, 
gaining more than 40 percent of the vote. But in post-
Mubarak Egypt electoral success was by no means 
guaranteed, even for the Brotherhood.This was under-
lined by the first free presidential elections, held 
in May and June 2012, and the referendum held in 
December 2012 to approve the new constitution 
essentially forced through by the Brotherhood. The 
Brotherhood’s candidate in the presidential elections, 
Mohammed Morsi, won only in the second round, and 
with just a small lead over his rival. And although 
more than 60 percent voted for the new constitution 
in the referendum, turn-out was below one third and 
especially in the urban centres the Brotherhood failed 
to secure a majority. 
Not least in view of these experiences, the Brother-
hood leadership appeared to be aware of the political 
importance of tangible social and economic progress. 
Developing Egypt’s economy after the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime was therefore granted a high prior-
ity. The established business elite was certainly not 
regarded as an adversary in this process. On the con-
trary, the Brotherhood attempted to win over this 
section of the old elites as a partner in the transforma-
tion process. This is made clear, as we will see below, 
by the organisation’s economic policy agenda, its 
efforts to establish and expand networks with busi-
ness, and its approach to dealing with Mubarak-era 
fraud and corruption. 
The Economic Policy Agenda and 
Its Implementation 
In spring 2011 the Brotherhood leadership asked 
Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood’s deputy 
leader, to thoroughly reappraise and revise the move-
ment’s political programme. SCAF had prematurely 
released Al-Shater from prison only in March of that 
year. Himself a successful businessman, he had ad-
ministered the Brotherhood’s finances since about 
2000 and risen to become its most powerful player.32 
But above all, he had decisively expanded the sway of 
the liberal business wing among the group’s leader-
ship, amongst them al-Shater’s long-time business 
partner Hassan Malek and members of the influential 
Al-Haddad family from Alexandria.33
Under al-Shater’s leadership, in the scope of the 
“renaissance project” (mashru’a al-nahda), several 
working groups were formed to develop long-term 
strategies for the Brotherhood in various policy 
fields.
 
34 Furthermore, teams of experts were sent 
abroad to examine the applicability of other devel-
opment models to Egypt.35 The findings of the Nahda 
project fed into both the FJP programme and Morsi’s 
presidential election programme.36
 
32  The Muslim Brotherhood also selected Kheirat al-Shater 
as its candidate for the presidential elections, but the elec-
toral commission rejected his nomination on the basis of a 
Mubarak-era conviction. Only then did the much less well-
known Mohammed Morsi take his place. 
 It was conspic-
33  On Hassan Malek see also pp. 15ff. Members of the 
Haddad family are back in leading positions: Gehad al-
Haddad joined the five-member steering committee of the 
Nahda project, his father Essam al-Haddad became the top 
adviser to (later) President Morsi and belongs, alongside his 
brother Medhat al-Haddad, to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Shura Council. 
34  “Khairat al-Shater on ‘The Nahda Project’: Complete Trans-
lation”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 13 (2012), http://www. 
currenttrends.org/research/detail/khairat-al-shater-on-the-
nahda-project-complete-translation (accessed 3 June 2013). 
35  Ivesa Lübben, “‘Wir sind Teil des Volkes’: Zur Rolle und 
Strategie der Muslimbrüder in der ägyptischen Revolution”, 
in Revolution und Regimewandel in Ägypten, ed. Holger Albrecht 
and Thomas Demmelhuber (Baden-Baden, 2013), 253. 
36  “Dr. Morsi’s Electoral Program – General Features of 
Nahda (Renaissance) Project”, FJPonline, 28 April 2012, http:// 
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uous that the fundamental economic thrust of both 
documents exhibited no consequential differences to 
the policies of the old regime.37
The programmes, contrary to certain expectations, 
did not by any means propose establishing an Islamic 
economic system, for example by introducing an 
Islamic banking system conforming to the Koranic 
ban on interest. That would not only have contra-
dicted the interests of foreign investors, but also those 
of the westernised domestic business elite. And even 
in terms of fighting poverty and strengthening under-
privileged groups, no fundamentally new moves were 
made. A massive increase in state activity in these 
fields was announced, but at the same time the lead-
ing role of foundations and charities was emphasised. 
Redistribution by means of a thorough reform of the 
tax system, which would particularly affect the busi-
ness elite, was not proposed.
 Of course individual 
points varied explicitly. For example changes were 
announced concerning the privatisation of publicly-
owned companies, because previous policy had 
neglected to encourage new investment. But a turn 
away from the private-sector course set under Muba-
rak was not called for. Instead the private sector was 
allocated the central role in the national development 
process, while coexisting with a strong public sector; 
a terminology echoing that used under Mubarak. 
38 Al-Shater at the same 
time did not tire of publicly underscoring the im-
portance of public-private partnerships – initiated 
under Mubarak and highly controversial in Egypt – for 
infrastructure development.39
 
fjponline.com/article.php?id=654 (accessed 4 June 2013); FJP, 
Party Platform 2011, http://www.fjponline.com/articles.php? 
pid=80 (accessed 4 June 2013). 
 And Hassan Malek even 
explicitly praised the efforts of former Industry Minis-
37  Mohammed El Dahshan, “Where Will the Muslim Brother-
hood Take Egypt’s Economy?”, YaleGlobal, 6 February 2012, 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/muslim-brotherhood-take-
egypts-economy (accessed 3 June 2013). 
38  For an analysis of the economic components of the Nahda 
project see also Peter Volkmar and Rachel Scheier, “In Depth 
Q-A. The ‘Renaissance’ Plan, Explained”, Business Monthly, 
August 2012. 
39  See for example Kheirat al-Shater’s speech to the United 
States Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (AMCHAM) on 7 May 
2012, http://www.amcham.org.eg/events_activities/events/ 
details/?ID=510&P=1#transcript (accessed 4 June 2013) and 
his video interview with Reuters on 8 April 2012, http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch? feature=player_embedded&v= 
l_xE0gBSaA0 (accessed 4 June 2013). 
ter Rachid Mohamed Rachid, especially with respect 
to generating foreign direct investment.40
This fundamental conceptual proximity to the eco-
nomic policy of the old regime and the associated turn 
to the private sector were reflected in the decisions 
made by the Morsi government. In November 2012 
the President acquired by decree direct influence on 
leadership appointments in the state-controlled Egyp-
tian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), rather than 
working for comprehensive reform of the trade union 
system as had been demanded by Egyptian civil 
society.
 
41 Changes in tax law passed in May 2013 by 
the Brotherhood-dominated Shura Council remained 
marginal and did nothing to rectify the social im-
balance of Egypt’s economic policy. Although Morsi 
slightly modified the progression in the income tax 
system, this did in no way represent a serious commit-
ment to the ability-to-pay principle. The same applies 
to business taxation. Although Morsi implemented a 
five-percentage-point increase, the same rate (of 25 
percent) applies to all businesses. There was also no 
comprehensive reform of capital gains taxes. The FJP’s 
2011 manifesto had declared its intention to intro-
duce a tax on share profits, and at the end of 2012 
Morsi implemented such a tax (which had already 
been announced by the SCAF-appointed government) 
in a watered-down form. However, protests from the 
financial sector forced the government to make a 
U-turn, abolishing the tax just two weeks after its 
introduction.42
Egypt’s policy towards international donor institu-
tions, first and foremost the International Monetary 
Fund, also remained constant under Morsi. In 2011 
the SCAF-appointed government had already begun 
negotiations with the IMF over a bridging loan to 
tackle Egypt’s rising balance of payments deficit. At 
 
 
40  “Egypt Brotherhood Businessman: Manufacturing Is Key”, 
Reuters, 28 October 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/10/27/egypt-brotherhood-investment-idUSL5E7LR4CK 
20111027 (accessed 2 June 2013). 
41  Decree No. 97/2012 lowered the maximum retirement 
age for trade union leaders to sixty. Dina Bishara, “Egyptian 
Labor between Morsi and Mubarak”, Foreign Policy 28 Novem-
ber 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/28/ 
power_grab_on_egypts_unions (accessed 4 June 2013). 
42  Although Morsi had already restricted the tax to profits 
from company takeovers (after initially proposing a general 
capital gains tax). Noha Mustafa, “Scrapped Capital Gains 
Tax Another Sign of Slapdash Economic Policies”, Egyptian 
Independent, 8 April 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/ 
news/scrapped-capital-gains-tax-another-sign-slapdash-
economic-policies (accessed 4 June 2013). 
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that point, the Muslim Brotherhood made its agree-
ment conditional on inclusion in the government, 
which SCAF rejected. The loan negotiations resumed 
after Morsi’s election, but he evidently feared that a 
deal with the IMF could have a negative impact on 
the FJP’s chances in the upcoming parliamentary elec-
tions. So the government first played for time by bor-
rowing on a large scale from sympathetic Islamic 
countries, first and foremost Qatar.43
Realpolitik also characterised Morsi’s stance to-
wards the armed forces’ business empire. Although 
government policy was fundamentally oriented 
towards the private sector, the economic role of the 
armed forces was not called into question. The new 
constitution forced through by the Brotherhood 
granted the military-dominated National Defence 
Council sole control over the military’s business 
activities.
 Morsi’s failure 
to reach a loan agreement with the IMF before he was 
toppled by the military thus resulted more from elec-
toral politicking than deep-seated ideological con-
cerns. 
44 Even under Morsi military enterprises 
were still able to profit from their close contacts with 
civilian ministries and the ensuing public contracts.45
Entry into the Formal Economy and 
Expansion of Networks with the Established 
Business Elite 
 
Parallel to the drafting of its economic policy agenda, 
businessmen within the Brotherhood began expand-
ing their own activities. Mubarak had worked to keep 
the Brotherhood’s economic base as small as possible. 
Especially in the last major wave of arrests at the end 
 
43  For an overview of borrowing see Rebecca M. Nelson and 
Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Con-
gress, Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2013, 8. 
44  Chams El-Dine, The Military and Egypt’s Transformation Process 
(see note 15), 6. 
45  Examples include the development of a tablet computer 
by a military enterprise in collaboration with the Informa-
tion Ministry and the transfer of the prominent state-run 
El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company to the Ministry 
of Military Production for restructuring to produce a car for 
the Egyptian market. “Minister of Military Production: Egypt 
Can Achieve Arms Self-sufficiency … and Presentation of First 
Tablet on 25 June” (Arabic), Al-Ahram, 4 June 2013 http://gate. 
ahram.org.eg/News/355347.aspxx (accessed 5 June 2013); 
“Investment Minister: Imminent Transfer of El Nasr Auto-
motive to Military Production to Produce First Egyptian Car” 
(Arabic), Al-Ahram, 27 June 2013, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/ 
News/364725.aspx (accessed 1 July 2013). 
of 2006 the security forces specifically targeted active 
business leaders. Numerous smaller businesses and 
holdings were confiscated. But in order to protect 
themselves from state repression Brotherhood mem-
bers had only been scarcely active in the formal econ-
omy anyway, at least not on a larger scale. For this 
reason there is also little in the way of reliable infor-
mation about the overall economic activities of Broth-
erhood members. Accusations by political adversaries 
that they control business empires worth billions are 
likely to be highly exaggerated. 
After being released from prison in the course of 
the political turmoil, Brotherhood entrepreneurs 
sought successfully to regain confiscated assets and 
expand their firms.46 One good example was the 
founding of the supermarket chain Zad Markets by 
Khairat al-Shater’s family. The idea is to offer cheap 
food through a large network of branches modelled 
on the German Aldi chain.47 For the established busi-
ness elite, however, such projects represent little in 
the way of threat. Firstly, the business activities of 
Brotherhood members were restricted largely to the 
retail sector.48
These efforts to expand into the formal economy 
were accompanied by the establishment of a Brother-
hood-linked business organisation, the Egyptian Busi-
ness Development Association (EBDA). Modelled on the 
 Secondly, the traditional elite was too 
dominant in the Egyptian economy for newly-founded 
ventures to represent serious competition. And re-
ported attempts by Brotherhood members to acquire 
existing major companies remained – to the extent 
that they occurred at all – unsuccessful. 
 
46  “Muslim Brotherhood Seeks to Re-open Members’ 
Companies”, Egypt Independent, 6 March 2011, http://www. 
egyptindependent.com/news/muslim-brotherhood-seek-re-
open-members-companies (accessed 5 June 2013). 
47  The first fifteen branches opened in summer 2012, and 
by mid-2018 the company plans to open 2,500 across the 
country. While that would make it the country’s largest retail 
group by a long chalk, market insiders told the author they 
strongly doubted the prospects of such an expansion. 
48  Brotherhood entrepreneurs plainly profited from good 
contacts to investors from the Gulf states and Turkey. Kheirat 
al-Shater and his business partner Hassan Malek, for example, 
ran a long-standing local distribution franchise for the Turk-
ish furniture manufacturer Istikbal. Abdel Rahman Seoudi, 
another Brotherhood entrepreneur detained under Mubarak, 
opened a distribution partnership with the Turkish furniture 
chain Doğtaş. “First Doğtaş Store Opens in Egypt”, Daily News 
Egypt, 21 December 2012, 8; “Al-Shater Inaugurates Zad 
Retail Chain”, Daily News Egypt, 16 July 2012, http://www. 
dailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/18/al-shater-inaugurates-zad-
retail-chain/ (accessed 4 June 2013). 
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Turkish MÜSIAD, which is closely allied with the 
governing AKP, EBDA officially began work in March 
2012 under the leadership of Hassan Malek, who was 
crucially responsible for the Brotherhood’s relations 
with the private business sector. But belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood was in no way made a precondi-
tion of membership. By February 2013 it had six 
hundred members, including some Christians.49 The 
objective was thus not only to help Brotherhood busi-
nessmen entering the formal economy, but also to 
create a business organisation friendly to the Brother-
hood.50 So it was not conceived as a rival to other 
employer’s organisations. On the contrary, its leaders 
included board members from other similar group-
ings, such as the agricultural wholesaler Samir 
al-Naggar, who leads the Agriculture Business Asso-
ciation, and Mohamed Mo’men, who belongs to the 
board of the Chamber of Food Industries.51 Nonethe-
less, EBDA evidently enjoyed more exclusive access 
than others to the political centre around Morsi, 
especially when it came to his foreign trips. Over-
representation of EBDA members in business dele-
gations accompanying Morsi provoked criticism 
from other business groupings.52
In founding EBDA the Brotherhood leadership was 
plainly also pursuing an objective of expanding rela-
tions with the established business elite. Although 
Brotherhood representatives repeatedly stress the im-
portance of small and medium-sized companies for 
 
 
49  Sherine Abdel-Razek, “New Faces of Business”, Al-Ahram 
Weekly, 20 February 2013. 
50  However, the Brotherhood denied any relationship to 
the EBDA. “Mahmoud Hussein: Muslim Brotherhood Will 
Not Stage Street Protests against President”, IkhwanWeb.com, 
9 October 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id= 
30319 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
51  Al-Naggar is one of the biggest players in the Egyptian 
agriculture sector. His company Daltex is by far the country’s 
largest potato exporter. Johann Kirsten, Rashid Hassan and 
Khabbab Abdalla, Creating a Competitive Strategy to Improve the 
Performance of an Agricultural Chain: A Case Study of Potatoes in 
Egypt (Pretoria, South Africa: University of Pretoria, [2004]), 
11, https://ifama.org/events/conferences/2004/cmsdocs/ 
Abdalla1139.pdf (accessed 5 June 2013). Mohammed Mo’men 
owns the Mo’men Group, which runs fast-food restaurants in 
Egypt and other countries in the region and produces frozen 
food. Mo’men Group, Brands and Services, http://www.momen-
group.com/en/spage/page/10 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
52  “Morsi’s Trip to India Creates Conflict with Some in Busi-
ness Community”, Daily News Egypt, 13 March 2012, http:// 
www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/03/13/morsis-trip-to-india-
creates-conflict-with-some-in-business-community/ (accessed 
5 June 2013). 
Egypt’s economy, names from the established business 
elite are also found among the members of EBDA.53 
Some of these had already been rumoured to have 
loose connections to the Muslim Brotherhood during 
the Mubarak era. That is not surprising, because the 
social milieus in which Brotherhood members and 
the business elite moved were by no means always 
separate. Individual members of the Brotherhood 
belonged to the Egyptian upper class and were inte-
grated into its social networks.54
One name repeatedly mentioned behind closed 
doors in connection to the Brotherhood before 2011 
was Safwan Thabet. Despite his family ties to the 
Brotherhood’s former spiritual leader, Ma’mun 
al-Hudaybi, Thabet succeeded in building a dairy 
empire under Mubarak. Founded in 1983, his com-
pany Juhayna had achieved market shares of more 
than 70 percent for particular products by 2011, and 
a market value of about $770 million.
 
55 Thabet was 
successful in establishing political security by building 
networks. His company’s stock market launch in 
2010, for example, was organised by the investment 
bank EFG-Hermes, in which Gamal Mubarak owned 
a stake.56 This closeness to the regime could also be a 
reason why Thabet appeared on the public prosecu-
tor’s blacklist in early 2011, only to be removed again 
within just a few weeks.57
Beyond that, members of the established business 
elite who had not previously been regarded as close to 
the Brotherhood also joined the new employers’ orga-
 Since then he has been offi-
cially closely associated with the Brotherhood. Thabet 
was one of the founding members of EBDA. 
 
53  Including Safwan Thabet (Juhayna), Samir al-Naggar 
(Daltex), Ahmed el-Sewedy (Elsewedy Electric) and Mohamed 
Farid Khamis (Oriental Weavers). 
54  It is thus unsurprising to learn that in 2007 Kheirat 
al-Shater sent his eldest son to study at the elite American 
University in Cairo (AUC) or that in 2006 the son of Nabil 
al-Muqbil, businessman and local Brotherhood leader in 
Giza, married the daughter of Adel Imam, the best-known 
Egyptian comedian and friend of Mubarak. 
55  Namely milk and liquid yogurt. Arabeya Online, Johayna 
Food Industries, https://www.aolbeg.com/aob/pdf/arabic7732. 
pdf (accessed 5 June 2013). 
56  In the course of the IPO, EFG-Hermes CEO Yasser al-Malla-
wany was given a seat on the Juhayna supervisory board, 
which he retains to this day. Al-Mallawany was closely con-
nected with Gamal Mubarak. Roll, Geld und Macht (see note 3), 
291. 
57  “Egypt Prosecutor Unfreezes Assets of 13 Businessmen”, 
Reuters, 23 May 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/ 
23/egypt-assets-idAFLDE74M24M20110523 (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
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nisation. Examples include the textile manufacturer 
Mohamed Farid Khamis (Oriental Weavers) and the 
cable producer Ahmed el-Sewedy (El Sewedy Cables). 
Both belonged to the inner circle of the business elite 
under Mubarak. And although neither was politically 
prominent, both maintained close contacts to the 
political elite. Another example is the banker Abdel 
Salam al-Anwar, who was appointed chair of EBDA’s 
financial affairs committee.58 During the final decade 
of the Mubarak era Al-Anwar was one of the best-
known managers in the Egyptian financial sector, and 
closely connected to Gamal Mubarak, as evidenced by 
his seat on the board of Gamal’s charity, the Future 
Generation Foundation.59
Dealing with Mubarak-Era 
Fraud and Corruption 
 
EBDA was not the Brotherhood’s only attempt to 
expand its ties with the established business elite. In 
July 2012 Morsi established the employers’ committee 
Tawassul (intercession), to mediate between the Presi-
dent and the private sector,60 discussing the problems 
and needs of private business in monthly sessions.61 
Hassan Malek was elected the committee’s spokes-
person. As well as a series of businessmen from EBDA, 
the twenty-three members included representatives 
of major employers’ organisations.62
 
58  Alaa Ahmad, “EBDA Founds Communication and Finan-
cial Sector Committees” (Arabic), Al-Ahram, 6 March 2013, 
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/317531.aspx (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
 But Tawassul did 
59  Al-Anwar headed the Egyptian subsidiary of the multi-
national bank HSBC from 2003 to 2011. He served as trea-
surer of the Future Generation Foundation and was also a 
member of a Mubarak-friendly thinktank, the Egyptian Cen-
tre for Economic Studies (ECES). Roll, Geld und Macht (see 
note 3), 284. 
60  “Committee Formed to Liaise between Morsy, Private 
Sector”, Egypt Independent, 31 July 2012, http://www. 
egyptindependent.com/news/committee-formed-liaise-
between-morsy-private-sector (accessed 5 June 2013). 
61  “Hassan Malek: Tawassul No Substitute for Political 
Committee” (Arabic), Al-Ahram, 28 August 2012, http:// 
digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1007074& eid= 
1349 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
62  Including Hussein Sabbour, President of the Egyptian 
Businessmen’s Association, and Alaa Arafa, President of the 
Textile Exporters’ Association and as majority owner of 
the Arafa Group himself one of the country’s leading textile 
manufacturers. For a list of members see Nagi Abdel Aziz, 
“Election of Malek as Spokesperson Marks Official Launch 
of Steering Committee Between Morsi and Private Sector”, 
more than articulate the interests of the business 
camp to the government in the economic develop-
ment process. Above all it played an important role 
in mediating between the government and members 
of the business elite under suspicion of corruption 
or already facing prosecution. 
In 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood was already inter-
nally floating the idea of out-of-court settlements for 
offences where no blood had been spilled.63 So its 
representatives responded correspondingly cautiously 
to civil society criticism of the investment law amend-
ment pushed through by SCAF in January 2012, which 
prepared the legal ground for out-of-court settlements. 
Indeed, after Morsi’s election efforts were stepped up 
to bring accused businessmen back to Egypt through 
such arrangements. In his function as Tawassul 
spokesperson Hassan Malek used the opportunity of 
an investors’ conference in London in January 2013 
to invite all foreign-based entrepreneurs to return to 
Egypt.64 Another amendment to the investment law 
approved by the Shura Council in February 2013 also 
allows investors to be legally represented in mediation 
hearings, rather than having to appear in person.65
 
 
 
 
Al-Masry al-Youm, 31 July 2012, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/ 
node/1020911 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
63  Interview with a leading member of the Muslim Brother-
hood, Cairo, July 2011. 
64  Carina Kamel, “Egypt Seeks to Regain Investor Confi-
dence, Bring Capitals Back Home”, Al Arabiya News, 25 January 
2013, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/01/25/262461. 
html (accessed 5 June 2013). 
65  “Egypt Govt to Facilitate Return of ‘Fleeing’ Businessmen”, 
Ahram Online, 13 February 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/3/12/64694/Business/Economy/Egypt-govt-to-
facilitate-return-of-fleeing-busines.aspx (accessed 5 June 2013). 
This would remove a decisive obstacle to out-of-court settle-
ments, as fear of detention makes many entrepreneurs whose 
cases are still open wary of returning. It is, however, unclear 
whether the law came into force before Morsi’s removal. 
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Limits of Rapprochement: Members of the Business Elite in 
Opposition to the Brotherhood 
 
The Brotherhood’s initiatives were met with scant 
approval among the established business elite. Most 
business leaders kept aloof or supported the growing 
civil and political opposition against the Brotherhood. 
Two motives were especially important. Firstly, some 
mistrusted the cooperation-seeking politics of the 
Brotherhood, and still feared being called to account 
for earlier transgressions by the new political leader-
ship. It is indeed the case that the Brotherhood repeat-
edly undermined its own policy of the “extended 
hand” by its rhetoric. For example, in a speech review-
ing his first hundred days in office Morsi pointed the 
finger at certain (unnamed) leading private companies 
and announced investigations against them.66
The Brotherhood itself initially saw no problem in 
its rejection by certain business leaders.
 At 
least in parts of the business elite this open threat 
was received with great nervousness. Secondly, many 
members of the business elite held more general 
reservations against the new political leadership. The 
Brotherhood representatives possessed no experience 
of government and were not trusted to lead Egypt in 
this difficult situation. And although the Brother-
hood’s economic programme called for a continuation 
of the status quo, much of the westernised top-entre-
preneurs rejected the Islamists’ social policy ideas. 
This was another reason for them to see themselves 
allied with the secularist opposition camp. 
67
 
66  “Morsi’s Corruption Remarks Drive Egypt Bourse Down”, 
Ahram Online, 8 October 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/3/12/55091/Business/Economy/Morsis-corruption-
remarks-drive-Egypt-Bourse-down.aspx (accessed 10 July 2013). 
 In the 
course of the summer 2012 presidential elections, in 
which Morsi only scraped a victory, this assessment 
appeared to shift. Three moves by the business side in 
particular created increasing difficulties for the 
government and consequently also for the Brother-
hood: the funding of parties and election campaigns, 
the founding and/or operating of critical media, and 
the systematic withdrawal of investment capital from 
Egypt. 
67  Interviews with Muslim Brotherhood representatives, 
Cairo, August 2011 and March 2012. 
Party Finance and Election Campaigns 
Hosni Mubarak’s forced resignation opened the way 
for a boom in funding of new parties. Alongside the 
twenty-three existing parties that had been registered 
under the old regime (the NDP having been dissolved 
in April 2011), thirty-four parties entered the parlia-
mentary elections held at the end of 2011 and begin-
ning of 2012.68 Because the new party law passed in 
March 2011 by the SCAF provided for no state fund-
ing,69 all groups were forced to quickly generate 
donations. Members of the established business elite 
grasped the opportunity to achieve political influence 
by funding particular parties. The forerunner here 
was the media and pharmaceuticals tycoon al-Sayyid 
al-Badawi, who in 2010 had been elected leader of the 
conservative nationalist but economically liberal Wafd 
Party and was one of its main donors. At the time of 
the parliamentary elections al-Badawi was supplying 
about 20 percent of the party budget.70 Members of 
the business elite had already been associated with the 
Wafd Party under Mubarak,71
 
68  Stephan Roll, “Länderporträt Ägypten”, in Arabische Zeiten-
wende. Aufstand und Revolution in der arabischen Welt (Berlin: Bun-
deszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 156–162 (158). 
 which earned the party 
69  Corresponding provisions from which the NDP in particu-
lar had profited in the Mubarak era were abolished under 
the new party law. Dina Guirguis, “Egypt Opposition Divided 
over New Political Parties Law”, Washington Institute Policy Alert, 
30 March 2011, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/egypt-opposition-divided-over-new-political-
parties-law (accessed 5 June 2013). 
70  “Profiles of Egypt’s Political Parties”, BBC News Middle East, 
25 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-
east-15899546 (accessed 5 June 2013). Al-Badawi is the major-
ity shareholder of the Egyptian pharmaceuticals company 
Sigma, which has a market share of more than 6 percent in 
the national generics sector and in 2010 recorded turnover 
of well over $100 million. Germany Trade & Invest, “Ägyptens 
Pharmamarkt expandiert”, 17 January 2013, http://www. 
gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/maerkte,did=743928.html 
(accessed 5 June 2013). He also owns the satellite channel 
Hayat TV (see also pp. 21ff.). For more detail on al-Badawi 
see “Al-Sayed Al-Badawi”, Jadaliyya, 18 November 2011, http:// 
www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3182/al-sayed-al-badawi 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
71  Apart from al-Badawi, this was above all the Coptic busi-
ness leader Mounir Fakhry Abdel Nour, who was Tourism 
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sharp criticism from opposition circles (even after the 
mass protests had begun, Wafd did not initially dis-
tance itself from the regime). For many members of 
the business elite this party therefore appeared an un-
attractive vehicle for their interests in the post-Muba-
rak era. They preferred instead to set up new parties. 
The Coptic industrialist Naguib Sawiris, who 
never tired of warning against the Islamist influence 
on Egyptian politics, was especially active in this 
respect.72 At the beginning of April 2011 Sawiris ini-
tiated the founding of the secular liberal, pro-business 
Free Egyptians Party (Hizb al-Masriyyin al-Ahrar), 
whose members include well-known names from the 
private sector and the secular-leaning upper class.73 
How much money Sawiris himself invested in the 
party cannot be verified, but there is reason to believe 
he was very forthcoming.74 The party claims to have 
recruited about 150,000 members before the 2011/ 
2012 parliamentary elections, in which it stood 150 
candidates. This was made possible by an expensive 
and professionally run advertising campaign.75
 
Minister from the cabinet reshuffle of February 2011 until 
Morsi formed his first government in August 2012. 
 Never-
theless, the Free Egyptians won only fifteen seats in 
the elections (on about 3 percent of the vote). 
72  Sawiris summed up his fundamental rejection in an inter-
view before the presidential elections. Asked why he would 
not be voting for the extremely moderate Islamist and former 
Brotherhood member Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who is regarded 
as liberal and pro-business, he replied: “I must say [he] is a 
very honest, nice man. […] So, some of my fellow liberals 
believe that he’s liberal. I don’t believe that, because I always 
feel very worried. In my building in Egypt, no priest can come 
and go up to our offices, because we think this is a place to 
work. If I went to pray, I would go to the church. And I’m 
always very worried when someone is very religious and like 
that, and he takes this as the only scope to run a country 
from.” Naguib Sawiris, “Remarks at the 2012 Weinberg 
Founders Conference”, Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 4 May 2012, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ 
uploads/SawirisTranscript20120504.pdf (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
73  Including Hani Sarie al-Din, influential business attorney 
and Sawiris family lawyer; Khaled Kandil, former board chair-
man of ExxonMobil Egypt; and Khaled Bishara, top manager 
of the Sawiris empire. 
74  Acording to party circles Sawiris contributed 20 percent 
of the total budget up until the parliamentary elections. “Pro-
files of Egypt’s Political Parties: Free Egyptians”, BBC News 
Middle East, 25 November 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-middle-east-15899997 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
75  The Party was assisted for five months by a well-known 
Egyptian advertising agency. Randa El Tahawy, “The Business 
of Campaigning”, Business Today Egypt, 10 August 2011, 28ff. 
The Free Egyptians saw themselves from the outset 
in fundamental opposition to the Muslim Brother-
hood and its FJP. Sawiris even said he had considered 
calling the party “The Egyptian Brothers” (al-Ikhwan 
al-Masriyyin), as a clear provocation to its political 
rival.76 Notably, this antagonism is hardly reflected 
in the economic policies of this “pro-business party”. 
Although the party supports the free market more 
vocally than the FJP, it similarly emphasises the need 
for state-managed development and infrastructure 
projects. The fact that economic policy is not the 
reason behind its opposition to the Brotherhood is 
underscored by the Free Egyptians Party’s electoral 
alliance with the socialist Tagammu’ Party, which in 
the past had argued vehemently against liberal eco-
nomic policies.77 The crux of its opposition to the FJP 
lies in the question of the status of religion in Egypt’s 
political system. Although the Free Egyptians, prob-
ably largely for tactical reasons, do not call for the 
abolition of the second article of the constitution that 
makes the principles of sharia the prime source of 
Egyptian law, nor explicitly call for a “secular state” 
(dawla ’almaniyya), they do stress more strongly than 
the FJP the “civil character” of the state and the asso-
ciated separation of state and religion.78
Especially in the party’s first months Sawiris used 
the Free Egyptians as a stage to mobilise against what 
he saw as the imminent threat of “Islamisation” of 
Egyptian society. But his often agitatory and some-
times insulting commentaries were met with criticism 
even from members of his own party, who saw their 
election prospects endangered. Other representatives 
of the business elite preferred a more discreet style 
and avoided publicising their financial involvement. 
Ahmed Ghabbour for example, head of the Coptic 
Ghabbour family whose Ghabbour Auto dominates 
the Egyptian car market, and according to party 
circles another major donor to the Free Egyptians,
 
79
 
76  “Sawiris at Free Egyptians Conference: Our Party Not 
Coptic, Our Programme Up for Discussion” (Arabic), Al-Masry 
al-Youm, 3 April 2011, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/ 
385401 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
 
remains absolutely silent on this score. And although 
Hisham al-Khazindar, co-founder of the largest Egyp-
77  The Free Egyptians were the leading party in the Demo-
cratic Bloc, which the Tagammu’ Party also joined. 
78  Free Egyptians Party, Party Programme (Arabic), http://www. 
almasreyeenalahrrar.org/PartyProgram.aspx (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
79  Interview with a leading member of the Free Egyptians, 
Cairo, October 2012. 
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tian private equity firm Citadel Capital, made no 
secret of his initial support for the Al-Adl Party (Jus-
tice Party),80
Money from the established business elite did not 
just flow towards opposition parties, but also into the 
campaigns of the non-Islamist presidential candidates. 
The presidential elections of May and June 2012 were 
preceded by an intense campaign, which observers 
estimated to have cost up to two billion Egyptian 
pounds ($225 million).
 he kept entirely out of the party work. 
81 Where this money originated 
from was not transparent. Although there were formal 
restrictions on campaign spending, with each can-
didate limited to 12 million pounds for his campaign, 
foreign donations banned and a limit of 200,000 
pounds on individual donations, the electoral com-
mission was unable to ensure that these rules were 
obeyed.82 While Mohammed Morsi was supported by 
the affluent Muslim Brotherhood, the two secular 
nationalist candidates – Amr Moussa, former sec-
retary-general of the Arab League, and Ahmed Shafiq, 
the last prime minister under Hosni Mubarak – appar-
ently received generous donations from certain busi-
ness circles.83
 
80  According to party members he supported the founding 
to the tune of one million Egyptian pounds (at that point 
about $150,000). 
 According to observers, especially in 
the second round Shafiq had “a whole army of fearful 
81  “Egypt’s Presidential Campaigns to Cost Billions: Ana-
lysts”, Al-Arabiya News, 19 April 2012, http://english. alarabiya. 
net/articles/2012/04/19/208866.html (accessed 5 June 2013); 
Mariam Badr al-Din and Salim Ala, “Economists: Two Billion 
Pounds for First Round Presidential Campaigning […]” 
(Arabic), Al-Youm al-Saba’a, 26 May 2012, http://ww1.youm7. 
com/News.asp?NewsID=688889&SecID=12&IssueID=168 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
82  Mara Revkin, “Lavish Campaign Spending by Egypt’s 
Presidential Candidates Prompts Official Inquiry”, Atlantic 
Council, 15 May 2012, http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/lavish-
campaign-spending-egypts-presidential-candidates-prompts-
official-inquiry (accessed 5 June 2013). 
83  This is backed up by public statements by individual busi-
ness figures. Naguib Sawiris said he would be voting for Amr 
Moussa; textile producer Alaa Arafa spoke out for Ahmed 
Shafiq. Mariam Fam and Tarek El-Tablawy, “Egyptians Vote 
for First Post-Mubarak Leader in Election”, Businessweek.com, 
23 May 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-22/ 
egyptians-choose-first-president-since-mubarak-in-landmark-
vote (accessed 5 June 2013); Sarah A. Topol, “Hope For Sta-
bility Unites Egypt’s Rich and Poor”, Businessweek.com, 18 June 
2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-17/ 
hope-for-stability-unites-egypts-rich-and-poor (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
businessmen behind him”.84
Funding Mass Media 
 His success in almost 
matching Morsi, who won by only 3 percentage points 
in the second round, was due not least to support 
from private media mostly owned by members of the 
business elite. 
At least since the presidential elections, the Muslim 
Brotherhood regarded the “partiality” of most of the 
Egyptian media as a problem, claiming that members 
of the established business elite who used to have 
close ties to the Mubarak regime used their invest-
ments in the media sector to support non-Islamist 
candidates and after Morsi’s victory to incite senti-
ment against the leadership. 
A series of well-known members of the business 
elite had indeed invested in Egyptian media. After the 
sector was opened up for private investment, which 
occurred incrementally from the late 1990s, new satel-
lite broadcasters and print media had been able to 
establish themselves in the national market. Many of 
them belonged to wealthy businessmen like Naguib 
Sawiris, Ahmed Bahgat and al-Sayyid al-Badawi, and 
under Mubarak they were by no means resolutely 
critical of the regime. But the partial privatisation of 
the Egyptian media sector did permit a significantly 
more open discourse, as the private operators at 
least partially followed a “commercial logic”.85
After the fall of the old regime the leeway for pri-
vate media initially increased only slightly. Although 
the military leadership repeatedly attempted to 
restrict and influence reporting, simplification of the 
licensing procedure led to the founding of numerous 
new media outlets and the stakes held by Egyptian 
entrepreneurs grew further (see Table 2, p. 
 And 
although certain private stations actively supported 
Mubarak when the protests first broke out, interviews 
and talk shows in private Egyptian satellite television 
were probably more influential on public opinion 
than the more widely discussed Qatari transnational 
broadcaster al-Jazeera. 
28). Certain 
television stations like al-Hayat and ONTV were used 
by their owners to broadcast advertising for political 
 
84  Economist Abdel Mudlib Abdel Hamid speaking to Al-Youm 
al-Saba’a. Badr al-Din and Ala, “Economists” (see note 81). 
85  Carola Richter, “Liberalisierung im ägyptischen Medien-
system und ihre Bedeutung für den politischen Umbruch 
2011”, in Revolution und Regimewandel, ed. Albrecht and Dem-
melhuber, (see note 35), 150. 
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parties they supported. It was also conspicuous that 
media controlled by parts of the business elite re-
ported very little about incidents that contradicted 
the economic interests of their owners. Strikes and 
workers’ protests increased drastically in the course 
of events, but were largely excluded from news 
reporting.86
When the political struggle increasingly shifted 
to the conflict between Islamists and “liberal” forces, 
above all in the course of the 2012 presidential elec-
tions, editorial influence by owners increased, 
according to reports by media insiders.
 
87 From the 
perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood the problem 
was less the smaller newspapers and satellite broad-
casters that agitated aggressively against the govern-
ment and the Brotherhood leadership,88
In 2004 Sawiris had already founded the daily 
newspaper al-Masry al-Youm, together with Salah Diab 
of Pico Group.
 than the 
large and very professionally run media holdings 
owned by Naguib Sawiris and Mohamed al-Amin, 
which appeared much more dangerous. Brotherhood 
representatives accused both of holding their satellite 
channels and newspapers to a strongly one-sided 
and exclusively critical line and stoking resentment 
against the government and the Brotherhood. 
89
 
86  “And You Thought Murdoch Was Evil: Media Ownership 
and Editorial Independence in Egypt”, Caravan, 19 March 
2012, http://academic.aucegypt.edu/caravan/story/and-you-
thought-murdoch-was-evil-media-ownership-and-editorial-
independence-egypt (accessed 5 June 2013). 
 And in 2007 he set up OTV as one of 
the first private satellite broadcasters in Egypt. Most 
of its assets were transferred in 2008 to ONTV, also 
founded by Sawiris. Both al-Masry al-Youm and ONTV 
were characterised by comparatively high journalistic 
standards and reported noticeably more independ-
ently than the state press. In the days of protest in 
early 2011 Sawiris – unlike other private media – per-
mitted free reporting. Although it became apparent 
87  Heba Afify, “Media Moguls Struggle to Keep Their Biases 
in Check”, Egypt Independent, 28 June 2012, http://www. 
egyptindependent.com/news/media-moguls-struggle-keep-
their-biases-check (accessed 5 June 2013). 
88  Such as the daily al-Sabah, founded in 2012 by Ahmed 
Bahgat who was plainly motivated to turn public opinion 
against the Muslim Brotherhood. Heba Fahmy, “New Daily 
Newspaper Al-Sabah Struggles to Make an Impact”, Egypt 
Independent, 26 October 2012, http://www.egyptindependent. 
com/news/new-daily-newspaper-al-sabah-struggles-make-
impact (accessed 5 June 2013). 
89  Proprietorial influence on al-Masry al-Youm was exposed 
in 2008 when the prominent publisher Hisham Kassem left 
in protest at interference in editorial matters. 
in the following months that reporting was restricted 
even in media controlled by Sawiris, this was attrib-
uted exclusively to the influence of the military 
leadership. While ONTV also generally gave airtime 
to Brotherhood representatives, in the course of the 
second round of the presidential elections observers 
complained of an increasing one-sidedness in the 
choice of talk show and studio guests in favour of 
Ahmed Shafiq.90 Journalists of al-Masry al-Youm also 
complained about the owner’s intervention in edi-
torial matters.91 After the presidential elections the 
paper became noticeably more critical of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, following the appointment as board 
chairman of Abdel Moneim Said, who had been in 
charge of the state-run Al Ahram Newspaper and Pub-
lishing House under Mubarak and was known as a 
sharp critic of the Muslim Brotherhood.92
Unlike Sawiris, Mohamed al-Amin only began in-
vesting in the Egyptian media sector after the fall 
of Mubarak. Al-Amin made his fortune with a con-
struction firm in Kuwait, and came to notice under 
Mubarak only as partner in one of the country’s 
largest construction firms, the Amer Group. The 
group’s majority partner, Mansour Amer, belonged 
to the business wing of the ruling party. In July 2011 
al-Amin founded the Capital Broadcasting Center 
(CBC), a satellite broadcaster with three channels 
whose presenters included journalists that had been 
close to the Mubarak regime in the past.
 
93
 
90  Afify, “Media Moguls Struggle” (see note 
 However, 
87). 
91  See amongst others Nora Younes, “Our ‘Naive’ Gener-
ation Will Bring Down Your Media System”, Egypt Independent, 
25 April 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/ 
our-%E2%80%98naive-generation-will-bring-down-your-media-
system (accessed 5 June 2013). 
92  The appointment was also seen as problematic among 
journalists at al-Masry al-Youm, because Abdel Moneim Said 
had been closely associated with the Mubarak regime as 
Chairman of the Board of Al Ahram Newspaper and Pub-
lishing House and a leading member of the NDP. See Naomi 
Sakr, Transformations in Egyptian Journalism (London and New 
York, 2013), 58. Sawiris himself surprised Egyptian public 
opinion at the end of 2012 by selling ONTV to French-
Tunisian media mogul Tarek Ben Ammar. But does not mean 
he is abandoning the Egyptian media sector. Sawiris retains 
a stake in al-Masry al-Youm and in May 2013 announced that 
he had taken a 30 percent stake in Ben Ammar’s holding 
company. “Sawiris, Ben Ammar Unveil 100M Euro Film 
Partnership”, Daily News Egypt, 17 May 2013, http://www. 
dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/17/sawiris-ben-ammar-unveil-
100m-euro-film-partnership/ (accessed 5 June 2013). 
93  Emad Mekay, “TV Stations Multiply as Egyptian Censor-
ship Falls”, New York Times, 13 July 2011. 
Limits of Rapprochement: Members of the Business Elite in Opposition to the Brotherhood 
SWP Berlin 
Egypt’s Business Elite after Mubarak 
September 2013 
 
 
 
22 
al-Amin increasingly also recruited media stars 
recognised in the opposition spectrum, such as the 
satirist Bassem Youssef, and successively bought up 
other satellite broadcasters including al-Nahar and 
invested in the print sector. He founded the daily 
newspaper al-Watan and took a stake in al-Youm 
al-Saba’a, a daily newspaper originally run by Ashraf 
al-Sherif, whose father, Safwat al-Sherif, was NDP 
Secretary-General and long-serving information minis-
ter under Hosni Mubarak.94 Because of al-Amin’s ob-
vious connections to the old regime and his aggressive 
and sometimes extremely costly expansion strategy, 
the Brotherhood saw him as a straw man for other 
members of the established business elite.95
The Brotherhood attempted to address the influ-
ence of private media on public opinion by three 
different means. Firstly, they stepped up their own 
activities in the private media sector. In 2011 the FJP 
founded the daily newspaper al-Hurriya wa al-Adala 
(named after the party). Businessmen close to the 
Brotherhood also launched the satellite broadcaster 
Misr25.
 
96 Secondly, the organisation attempted 
to secure influence over state-run media through 
appointments. In summer 2012 the upper house 
of parliament decided that the top management 
positions in fifty-five state-run newspapers would 
be readvertised. Although the move was in line with 
the law, it still triggered strong public criticism, focus-
sing especially on the change of the editor-in-chief 
of the three major state-run newspapers al-Ahram, 
al-Akhbar and al-Gumhuriya.97
 
94  “He Owns 14 Satellite Channels and Three Newspapers 
to Attack the Revolution […]” (Arabic), Bawaba al-Ahram 
al-Arabi, 12 December 2012, 
 Thirdly, the Morsi govern-
ment initiated legal steps against the reporting of pro-
opposition television stations and print media, with a 
rising volume of charges against presenters and jour-
nalists. In spring 2013 the satirist Bassem Youssef, 
whose show was broadcast on CBC, was arrested. This 
represented a watershed to the extent that now even 
http://arabi.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/ 
17973.aspx (accessed 5 June 2013). 
95  Interview with a leading member of the Muslim Brother-
hood, Berlin, 12 March 2013. 
96  Noha El-Hennawy, “Looking to Consolidate Its Influence, 
Brotherhood Takes to the Media”, Egypt Independent, 27 De-
cember 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/ 
looking-consolidate-its-influence-brotherhood-takes-media 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
97  Altogether 243 applied for the 55 posts. Representatives 
of the Journalists’ Syndicate in particular complained that 
the selection process had been unprofessional. Sakr, Trans-
formations in Egyptian Journalism (see note 92), 59ff. 
the international media began reporting on the 
Brotherhood’s actions.98 The General Investment 
Authority, as the body responsible for licensing satel-
lite broadcasters, also threatened to withdraw CBC’s 
licence, in a move criticised by legal experts as a 
problematic intervention in media freedoms by the 
executive.99
The Brotherhood’s efforts remained unsuccessful. 
Their engagement in the media sector failed to create 
any serious competition to the satellite channels and 
newspapers run by the private sector. In particular, 
they were unable to offer any credible alternative to 
the popular evening talk shows presented by well-
known established journalists. In the state-run media 
strong resistance formed against Brotherhood inter-
ference. Here it was also relevant that Egypt’s jour-
nalists tend to be overwhelmingly critical of the 
Brotherhood.
 
100 Simply changing top management 
could therefore hardly influence reporting. The legal 
actions of the executive also met their limits: the 
popularity of individual formats such as Bassem 
Youssef’s satire programme actually increased as a 
result of the prosecution. These measures also pro-
voked massive criticism abroad, amid fears that 
Egyptian press freedom was being curtailed.101 Not 
least for that reason, Morsi apparently felt compelled 
to drop charges raised by the presidential office 
against individual journalists.102
 
98  Ibid., 70ff. 
 
99  Rana Mohammed Taha, “The Legality of Closing Down 
CBC”, Daily News Egypt, 3 April 2013, http://www. 
dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/03/the-legality-of-closing- 
down-cbc/ (accessed 5 June 2013). 
100  This conclusion was reached not only by media insiders 
close to the Muslim Brotherhood, like prominent journalist 
Fahmi Huweidi, but also dogged opponents such as the 
sociologist Saad al-Din Ibrahim. Abdallah Schleifer, “Egypt’s 
Media Quagmire Worsens”, Al-Arabiya, 3 April 2013, http:// 
english.alarabiya.net/en/views/2013/04/03/Are-Egypt-s-
journalists-all-activists-.html (accessed 5 June 2013); Iman 
al-Gamal, “President Morsi Is Bad But the Others Are Worse” 
(interview with Fahmi Huweidi, Arabic), Al-Qabas, 12 February 
2013, http://www.alqabas.com.kw/node/739545 (accessed 
5 June 2013). 
101  For example the report “Predators of Freedom of In-
formation in 2013”, published by the international NGO 
Reporters Without Borders, which brands the Muslim 
Brotherhood an enemy of press freedom, http://fr.rsf.org/ 
IMG/pdf/predators_ 2013_en.pdf (accessed 12 July 2013). 
102  “Egypt’s Mursi Drops Complaints against Journalists”, 
Reuters, 10 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
04/10/us-egypt-mursi-idUSBRE93912E20130410 (accessed 5 
June 2013). 
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Investment Boycott and Capital Flight: 
The Case of OCI 
It was not only indirect political influence by mem-
bers of the business elite through funding of parties, 
campaigns and media that created problems for the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Above all the unwillingness of 
the established business elite to invest in the Egyptian 
economy increasingly became a problem. In view 
of dramatically falling foreign direct investment, 
reduced by more than 80 percent between financial 
years 2009/2010 and 2011/2012,103 the refusal of 
certain major Egyptian companies to invest hit the 
domestic economy particularly hard. The attempt 
to persuade exiled members of the business elite to 
return failed. Worse yet, Egypt’s biggest private com-
pany Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) an-
nounced its intention to leave, shortly after Hassan 
Malek’s January 2013 invitation (at Morsi’s behest) to 
the biggest business families to return. The main 
shareholders in OCI, first and foremost the Sawiris 
family who hold more than 55 percent, had for this 
purpose set up a Dutch public limited company. In a 
takeover offer to shareholders the share capital of 
OCI was to pass completely to the new firm Orascom 
Construction Industries NL.104
The move was a double blow. Firstly, the long-term 
consequences for Egypt’s state revenues were not 
foreseeable. Although the company stressed that it 
intended to continue its activities in the Egyptian 
market, after the planned take-over the parent com-
pany would be taxed in the Netherlands. Secondly, the 
company’s departure would represent a massive loss 
of status for the Egyptian stock exchange. At the end 
of 2012 OCI, as the biggest company, represented 
almost 15 percent of the market capitalisation of the 
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) and a considerable propor-
tion of its trading. Especially for international inves-
tors, who had already withdrawn funds on a large 
scale since early 2011, investment in this market 
would become even less attractive if the internation-
ally known firm were to move abroad.
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103  Ministry of Finance, Financial Data and Statistics, http:// 
 
www.mof.gov.eg/English/Pages/External-Sectors.aspx 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
104  OCI, Offering Circular, 18 January 2013, http://www.ocinv. 
nl/media/cms_page_media/45/OCI_Offering_ Circular.pdf 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
105  Delisting OCI would reduce the weight of the Egyptian 
exchange in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
Index, on which many international investors base the spread 
Apart from the direct consequences for the national 
economy, the departure of OCI was dangerous from 
Morsi’s perspective mainly because of the message it 
sent to other Egyptian companies. OCI had claimed 
that the decision to list the company in Amsterdam 
was based largely on an internationalisation strategy. 
Since the 1990s other well-known Egyptian companies 
had also successfully pursued such a strategy of 
expansion into foreign markets.106 Their owners 
could, in view of the political uncertainty in Egypt, 
also be tempted to change the nationality of their 
companies – with dramatic consequences for the 
Egyptian economy. For this reason in March 2013 the 
financial regulator tightened the rules for trading 
Egyptian share companies on international ex-
changes.107
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA), which was responsible for approving the share 
swap, initially played for time, requesting OCI to 
reveal further information on the planned transac-
tion.
 
108 At the same time the Egyptian tax authorities 
swung into action. At the beginning of 2013, appar-
ently days before OCI announced its plans, they had 
delivered to the company a demand for 4.7 billion 
Egyptian pounds ($799 million) in back taxes.109
 
of their investments. Nadia Saleem, “Orascom Deal May 
Dampen Egypt’s Stock Market”, Reuters, 13 February 2013, 
http://
 After 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/13/egypt-orascom-
delisting-idUSL5N0BD0C320130213 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
106  Including the Mansour family’s conglomerate, which is 
the world’s biggest independent General Motors distributor; 
the al-Chiaty family’s tourism empire, which also owns 
the German Steigenberger hotel group; and the el-Sewedy 
family’s cable and power engineering business, which has 
subsidiaries across the Middle East as well as in Africa and 
Europe. 
107  Specifically, the rules for issuing global depository 
receipts (GDRs), which certify ownership of shares and can 
be traded globally in their place. Especially for international 
investors, GDRs represent an attractive instrument for invest-
ing in emerging markets. At the point of the share swap offer 
GDRs had been issued for 75 percent of OCI’s shares, which 
could be exchanged for shares in the new Dutch company 
without the approval of the financial regulator EFSA. In 
March 2013 the EFSA restricted GDR issuance to one third 
of a company’s share capital. “Update 1 – Egypt Sets Limits 
On Share Transfers of Local Stocks”, Reuters, 4 March 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/egypt-bourse-
idUSL6N0BWDPN20130304 (accessed 5 June 2013). 
108  OCI, Press Release, 20 February 2013, http://www.ocinv.nl/ 
media/cms_page_media/2013/2/20/OCI%20N%20V%20 
Comments%20on%20Statement%20by%20the%20EFSA.pdf 
(accessed 5 June 2013). 
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the announcement of the planned share swap they 
increased their pressure on the company, and espe-
cially on the Sawiris family. In March the state prose-
cutor imposed a travel ban on the two main share-
holders, Nassif and Onsi Sawiris. On top of that, the 
authorities now put the tax debt at about 14 billion 
pounds ($2.1 billion).110
The escalation between the Sawiris family and the 
Morsi government was extremely disadvantageous for 
both sides. Although the travel ban was only a sym-
bolic act, because the family had long since left the 
country, the move greatly worried other members of 
the Egyptian business elite and deterred the exiles 
among them from returning. Quiet public criticism 
even came from the business milieu of the EBDA, 
suggesting that Morsi’s move was not agreed in 
advance with the Brotherhood’s own business orga-
nisation.
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The Sawiris also did not have the slightest interest 
in such an escalation. Although the family had been 
able to move considerable wealth abroad, Egypt 
remained a central market for them, as it was for 
the other leading business families that had left the 
country. Hence, both sides were ultimately forced to 
talk. Following intense mediation by Hassan Malek an 
agreement was reached at the end of April 2013.
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many observers appeared constructed, related to the sale of 
the company’s cement operations in 2007. OCI, Press Release, 
8 March 2013, http://www.orascomci.com/filestore/ 
OCICommentsonStatementsfromEgyptianTaxAuthorityand 
ReiteratesStrongPositiononTaxCaseOCISAEfinal.pdf (accessed 
5 June 2013). 
 
OCI agreed to pay back taxes of 7.1 billion pounds 
($1 billion). In return the authorities dropped further 
investigations and OCI was able to continue the share 
swap and transfer ownership to the new Dutch com-
pany. Most importantly, the travel bans were lifted. 
When Onsi Sawiris returned from exile in early May 
accompanied by his eldest son Naguib, this was inter-
110  Sherine Abdel-Razek, “Travel Ban on ‘Egypt’s Rocke-
fellers’” , Al-Ahram Weekly, 30 April 2013. 
111  As stated for example by EBDA board member Moham-
med El Demerdash. Ahmed A. Namatalla and Nadine Mar-
roushi, “OCI Tax Debacle in Egypt Stokes Concern over Who 
Might Be Next”, Bloomberg.com, 21 March 2013, http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-21/oci-tax-debacle-in-egypt-
stokes-concern-over-who-might-be-next.html (accessed 5 June 
2013). 
112  “Nassif Sawiris to Al-Youm al-Saba’a: Engineer Hassan 
Malek Played Positive Role in Agreement Between Orascom 
Construction and Tax Authorities” (Arabic), Al-Youm al-Saba’a, 
30 April 2013, http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID= 
1043509& (accessed 5 June 2013). 
preted by the Egyptian public as a sign of reconcilia-
tion between Morsi and the opposition business 
elite.113 But Naguib Sawiris certainly did not give up 
his support for the opposition. Only a few days after 
returning he demonstratively took part in the party 
conference of the Free Egyptians, again underlining 
his rejection of the Morsi government.114
 
 
 
 
113  Wafaa Basiouny, “Will Sawiris’s Homecoming Revive 
the Egyptian Economy?” (Arabic), Moheet.com, 4 May 2013, 
available via http://www.moheet.com (accessed 5 June 2013). 
114  “Free Egyptians Hold the First Conference Attended by 
Sawiris” (Arabic), Moheet.com, 10 May 2013, available via http:// 
www.moheet.com (accessed 5 June 2013). 
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Outlook and Conclusions 
 
On 3 July 2013 the armed forces again took power in 
Egypt. Mohammed Morsi was stripped of office and 
detained, the constitution suspended, and leading 
Brotherhood members jailed. The Brotherhood’s 
attempt to consolidate the power they had attained 
through elections was brought to an abrupt end. The 
movement had failed to provide convincing answers 
to the country’s social and economic problems. In-
stead it had questionably forced through a new con-
stitution against the opposition’s resistance and used 
its dominance of the upper house of parliament to 
pass restrictive laws controlling civil society and the 
media. In the process, the Brotherhood exhibited a 
continuity with the Mubarak era not only in its eco-
nomic policies but also in a style of politics that 
adhered to old patterns: intransparency and exclusion 
of actors outside the Brotherhood were both indica-
tions that the organisation lacked the capacity to open 
itself up to wider sections of civil society. 
The mass protests at the end of June 2013, on the 
first anniversary of Morsi’s presidency, were the result 
of this political failure. Nevertheless, the narrative dis-
seminated in Egypt and abroad that the generals had 
merely implemented the will of the people by remov-
ing Morsi is too superficial. The generals were fol-
lowing massive self-interest, concerned above all that 
political paralysis threatened to bankrupt the state 
and sink the bloated military apparatus along with its 
business empire.115 The violent crackdown by security 
forces with hundreds of “anti-coup” demonstrators 
killed,116
 
115  On the interests of the military see Stephan Roll and Max 
Gallien, “Putsch mit Plan: Ägyptens Militär sichert mit der 
Machtübernahme eigene Interessen ab”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
15 July 2013. 
 mass arrests of Islamist and ban of several 
media outlets indicates that the military leadership is 
not interested in restarting democratic transition but 
116  The violant dispersals of sit-ins of so-called anti-coup 
demonstrators in mid-August with more than six hundred 
protesters killed were described by Human Rights Watch 
as “the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in 
modern Egyptian history”. See “Egypt: Security Forces Used 
Excessive Lethal Force”, Human Rights Watch, 19 August 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-
used-excessive-lethal-force (accessed 1 September 2013). 
in total exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other Islamist opposition from the political process. 
Other established interest groups had also appar-
ently been working for the fall of Morsi’s government, 
including much of Egypt’s business elite. To what 
extent business interests were directly involved in the 
coup or its preparation will, if ever, only be clarified 
in hindsight. But there are already some indications. 
Naguib Sawiris has openly admitted supporting the 
Tamarrod (Rebellion) campaign with money and 
organisation. Tamarrod activists began by collecting 
signatures against Morsi and then organised mass 
protests at the end of June. Furthermore, members 
of the business elite or their representatives had 
apparently been in discussions with the generals in 
advance of the coup.117 In this connection it seems 
quite possible that networks connecting important 
Egyptian entrepreneurs and business families to 
political leaders in the Gulf region were helpful in 
securing Egypt badly needed financial assistance.118
But above all, as this analysis demonstrates, mem-
bers of the established business elite had already been 
working for months against the Brotherhood. The 
means and instruments were abundantly at hand. 
After the fall of Mubarak these actors had in no sense 
relinquished their predominance in Egypt’s economy. 
They were not willing to work with the Brotherhood, 
too great was their mistrust of the new administra-
tion. Moreover, many of the secular-leaning business 
leaders also held fundamental misgivings about polit-
ical Islam. 
 
For the military leadership this was probably a 
decisive factor for their intervention. 
And so they celebrated Morsi’s removal, as did 
the Egyptian stock exchange. Despite continuing 
 
117  Ben Hubbard and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Sudden Im-
provements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine 
Morsi”, New York Times, 10 July 2013; Matt Bradley, “In Egypt, 
the ‘Deep State’ Rises Again”, Wall Street Journal, 12 July 2013. 
118  Immediately after Mursi’s ouster the three Gulf coun-
tries promised Egypt aid packages worth $12 billion. See 
Patrick Werr, “Analysis: With Gulf Aid, Egypt Economy Can 
Limp through Crisis”, Reuters, 20 August 2013, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/us-egypt-protests-economy-
analysis-idUSBRE97J08M20130820 (accessed 30 August 2013). 
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uncertainty over the country’s future, the key EGX 
index recorded a rise of more than 12 percent in the 
week after the coup. The composition of the tran-
sitional government under Prime Minister Hazem 
al-Beblawi must also have turned out quite to their 
liking. The well-known economist al-Beblawi is 
regarded as a market liberal, as is his deputy Ziad 
Bahaa el-Din, who under Mubarak headed first the 
Egyptian Investment Authority, later the Financial 
Supervisory Authority, and is now Minister of Inter-
national Cooperation. In the person of Mounir Fakhry 
Abdel Nour, who was SCAF’s tourism minister in 
2011/12, a prominent businessman received the job 
of industry minister. Abdel Nour previously briefly 
headed the ECES, the research institute that designed 
and supported the economic reforms pushed through 
by the business elite in Mubarak’s last decade. The 
new Finance Minister Ahmed Galal was even more 
closely associated with ECES. As a World Bank econo-
mist who served with interruptions as ECES director 
from 1996 to 2006, he had had decisive influence on 
the formulation of the economic policy agenda during 
that period. 
The transitional government is due to serve only 
until the next parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions, which are scheduled to take place as soon as a 
new constitution has been passed. Altogether this 
transformation process is not supposed to take more 
than nine months. Whether it will be possible to make 
far-reaching economic policy decisions at all in that 
short time is doubtful. In the face of continuing 
protests, the government could be too preoccupied 
with securing its own power. Anyway, the new govern-
ment’s free-market positions represent no contradic-
tion to Morsi’s equally free-market agenda. And the 
Egyptian armed forces will, as under Morsi, retain a 
veto over fundamental reforms. Nonetheless, the 
choices for central economic posts in the new cabinet 
suggest that the influence of the Egyptian business 
elite could be set to increase. 
Germany and its European partners should take 
much greater account of this in their long-term co-
operation with Egypt. In the past it has been seen that 
such influence can have negative effects on the shap-
ing of economic reforms. Irrespective of short-term 
measures against the military leadership in Cairo, two 
especially important mechanisms need to be counter-
acted in future. 
Firstly, the intermingling of business interests 
and overall political responsibility prevented the 
emergence of the free and above all fair competition 
repeatedly announced in Egyptian political position 
papers. Corruption and self-enrichment were the 
consequence of selective implementation of institu-
tional reforms, from which only a small group of 
businessmen profited. The inadequate expansion 
of competition and market oversight, for example, 
enabled individual entrepreneurs to establish oli-
gopoly or even monopoly structures almost unhin-
dered in various sectors of the Egyptian economy. 
Germany and the European Union should increase 
pressure towards a reform of the economic regulatory 
framework and support corresponding measures 
through financial incentives and knowledge transfer. 
It is of central importance here to create greater trans-
parency in the area of state activity, for example in the 
awarding of public contracts, privatisation processes 
and land sales. In this context the professionalisation 
of the country’s media sector, should also be pro-
moted. State-owned outlets and large parts of the pri-
vate media are far from being independent. 
At the same time the consequences of past policies 
must be dealt with. It is certainly not the task of ex-
ternal actors to rectify the predominance of individual 
companies in the Egyptian economy. But Germany 
and the European Union should examine whether 
their own measures and instruments encourage such 
developments, for example by supporting public-
private partnerships between the Egyptian state and 
local businesses. 
Secondly, the political influence wielded by busi-
ness interests harms the social balance of Egypt’s 
economic policy. The economic course under Muba-
rak, dominated by business and focussed exclusively 
on growth, cemented inequality in the country. The 
regime attempted at least to dampen social tensions 
by operating a costly and inefficient subsidy system 
that ultimately took Egypt to the brink of bankruptcy. 
The one-sided course was exacerbated by national and 
international development partners that welcomed 
the emphasis of reform policies on higher growth 
rates and global competitiveness. Future cooperation 
should much more strongly foreground a broad im-
pact of economic growth, which cannot be achieved 
without a more active redistribution policy by the 
Egyptian state. Germany and the European Union 
should therefore support the overdue reform of the 
tax system and tax administration to boost the state’s 
ability to fund itself. But above all, deep tax reform 
would also permit a more equitable income distribu-
tion to be instituted. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
Members of the Egyptian business elite with net assets exceeding $100 million, early 2011 
Name Business Sector 
Mohamed Abu el-Enein Ceramic Cleopatra Group Ceramics 
Alaa Arafa Arafa Holding Textiles 
Salah Diab Pico Engineering Holding Engineering 
Hamed al-Chiaty Travco Group Holding Tourism 
Ahmed Ezz El-Ezz Steel Rebars Steel, ceramics 
Shafiq Gabr Artoc Group for Investment and Development Construction, consumer goods, services 
Raouf Ghabbour Ghabbour Auto Cars 
Mohamed Khamis Oriental Weavers Textiles 
Ahmed al-Maghrabi MMID Health, agriculture  
Mahmoud family Mohammed Mahmoud and Sons Group Luxury goods 
Mohamed Mansour Mansour Group Consumer goods, commercial vehicles 
Khaled Nosseir Alkan Holding Telecommunications, textiles, construction 
Mohamed Rachid Rachid Group Consumer goods 
Hussein Salem HKS Group Energy, tourism 
Sallam family Olympic Group Electronics, domestic appliances 
Naguib Sawiris Orascom Telecom Telecommunications 
Nassif Sawiris Orascom Construction Industries Construction, land development, construc-
tion materials, fertilisers 
Samih Sawiris Orascom Development Holding Land development, tourism 
Ahmed el-Sewedy El Sewedy Cables Construction materials 
Sheta family International Group for Investment Construction, land development, energy 
Safwan Thabet Juhayna Group Food 
Talaat Moustafa family Talaat Moustafa Group Construction, land development 
Sources: Interviews and analysis of company data. The list is not necessarily complete; in many cases information on wealth  
is almost impossible to verify. 
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Table 2 
Leading Egyptian media magnates 
Name Core business Satellite station(s) (founded) Print media (founded) 
Naguib Sawiris Telecommunications ONTV (2008) al-Masry al-Youm (2004)/ 
Egypt Independent  
(English-language version) 
Mohamed al-Amin Construction CBC (2011); 
al-Nahar (2011) 
al-Watan (2011);  
al-Youm al-Saba’a (2008) 
Salah Diab Energy, construction, agriculture  al-Masry al-Youm (2004) 
al-Sayyid al-Badawi Pharmaceuticals al-Hayat (2008)  
Ahmed Bahgat Construction, tourism, services Dream TV (2001) al-Sabah (2012) 
Hassan Kamel Rateb Construction materials al-Mehwar (2002)  
Mohamed Abu el-Enein Ceramics Sada al-Balad  
Sources: Sakr, Transformations in Egyptian Journalism (see note 92); Doha Centre for Media Freedom,  
http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/media-tycoons-egypt (accessed 16 July 2013); Roll, “Finance Matters” (see note 7) 
Abbreviations 
AUC American University in Cairo 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CBC Capital Broadcasting Center 
EBDA Egyptian Business Development Association 
ECES Egyptian Center for Economic Studies 
EFSA Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
EGX Egyptian Exchange 
ETUF Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
FJP Freedom and Justice Party 
GAFI General Authority for Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDR Global depository receipt 
IGA Illicit Gains Authority 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International 
NDP National Democratic Party 
OCI Orascom Construction Industries 
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
